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I. INTRODUCTION1 
One morning in April 2015, a father walked into his three-
year-old son’s room, probably expecting to hear the sounds of his 
son talking or playing, or other “ordinary” household sounds.2 
Instead, the child’s father heard an adult male voice come 
through the baby monitor, saying “Wake up little boy, daddy’s 
looking for you.”3 On other occasions, the child’s father had 
heard the voice on the monitor say, “Look someone’s coming,” 
and “Someone’s coming into view.”4 The family later determined 
that the baby monitor had been remotely hacked by a stranger, 
which also allowed the individual to control the camera on the 
baby monitor, therefore allowing the hacker to spy on the 
                                                          
 1. The title of this article is a reference to E.M. Forster’s 1909 science 
fiction novella, THE MACHINE STOPS, which depicts a dystopian world where all 
the needs of individuals are provided by the omnipotent, global “Machine.” E.M. 
FORSTER, THE MACHINE STOPS (1909), http://archive.ncsa.illinois.edu 
/prajlich/forster.html. Portions of this article include material adapted from 
“Global Privacy and Data Protection,” a chapter published in the course 
handbook for the Practising Law Institute’s (PLI) COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 2017 conference held November 9-10, 2017. The author of the 
chapter, Prof. Jane Kirtley, granted to PLI non-exclusive rights to publish the 
chapter in COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, retaining the right 
to republish the contents elsewhere. JEFFREY P. CUNARD ET AL., PRACTISING L. 
INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017 (2017). 
 2. Crimesider Staff, Baby Monitor Hacker Delivers Creepy Message to 
Child, CBS NEWS (April 23, 2015, 9:08 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news 
/baby-monitor-hacker-delivers-creepy-message-to-child/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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family.5 Two years earlier, a family in Texas reported very 
similar events: a hacker had been spying on and speaking to 
their two-year-old daughter.6 The hackers were able to do so 
because the baby monitors were connected to the internet and a 
smart phone app that allows parents to monitor their child.7 
Baby monitors are one of numerous devices that are part of 
the Internet of Things (IoT), a network of “smart” devices that 
can connect to the internet. The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) defines the IoT as “devices or sensors – other than 
computers, smartphones, or tablets – that connect, communicate 
or transmit information with or between each other through the 
Internet,” creating a network.8 These devices or sensors are 
increasingly sold commercially to consumers, but can also be 
“sold in a business-to-business context, such as sensors in hotel 
or airport networks.”9 The IoT can also encompass “broader 
machine-to-machine communications that enable businesses to 
track inventory, functionality, or efficiency.”10 Examples of IoT 
devices include smart cars, home appliances, thermostats, 
wearable devices, medical devices, and more.11 
                                                          
 5. Id.; see also Yael Grauer, Security News This Week: Turns Out Baby 
Monitors Are Wildly Easy to Hack, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/09/security-news-week-turns-baby-monitors-
wildly-easy-hack/ (“When security firm Rapid 7 tested nine widely available 
internet-connected baby monitors for security vulnerabilities, the results 
weren’t pretty. ‘Eight of the nine cameras got an F and one got a D minus,’ 
security researcher Mark Stanislav told Fusion’s Kashmir Hill.”). 
 6. Ryan Grenoble, Hacked Baby Monitor Caught Spying On 2-Year-Old 
Girl in Texas (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/hacked-baby-monitor-houston-texas-
parents_n_3750675.html; see also Jessica Willey, Hacker Targets Houston 
Family’s Baby Monitor, ABC 13 (Aug. 13, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://abc13.com 
/archive/9201651/. 
 7. Seen at 11: Cyber Spies Could Target Your Child Through a Baby 
Monitor, CBS N.Y. (April 21, 2015, 11:28 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015 
/04/21/seen-at-11-cyber-spies-could-target-your-child-through-a-baby-monitor/. 
 8. Jane E. Kirtley, Global Privacy and Data Protection–2015, in 1 
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2015, at 655, 
674 (2015); FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS: 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2015), https://www.ftc.gov 
/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-
november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Andrew Meola, Internet of Things: Devices, Applications & Examples, 
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com 
/internet-of-things-devices-applications-examples-2016-8. 
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On January 29, 2017, Forbes reported that the IoT market 
was predicted to reach $276 billion by 2020, with “predictive 
maintenance, self-optimizing production, and automated 
inventory management” as the top three uses of IoT 
technology.12 On February 7, 2017, Gartner predicted that 8.4 
billion IoT devices would be in use globally in 2017, rising 31 
percent from 2016.13 On October 24, 2017, IHS Markit estimated 
that there were nearly 27 billion IoT devices worldwide in 2017, 
three times the estimate of Gartner.14 IHS Markit predicted the 
number of devices would jump to over 30 billion by 2020.15 
Despite the rapid growth of the devices, and the potential 
benefits they offer, the IoT raises significant security and 
privacy concerns. The most significant challenge is to determine 
whether a self-regulatory regime will be sufficient to address 
these concerns, or whether comprehensive or sectoral legislation 
or regulation will be necessary to ensure that the public interest 
in protecting personal privacy and data security will be 
addressed, and that adequate remedies will be available in the 
event of systemic failures. 
This article first addresses the security issues and concerns 
arising from the IoT, drawing particular attention to recent 
cyberattacks targeting computer systems and the IoT. This 
article next turns to the privacy issues related to IoT devices, 
especially those containing health data and data collected from 
children, which led to actions by Mattel, the FTC, and the FBI 
to mitigate some of the privacy concerns. 
Third, this article examines regulatory actions in the United 
States by the federal government, including the FTC, National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), four 
U.S. Senators, and four U.S. Representatives, as well as by 
private companies within the IoT industry practicing self-
regulation. As a means of comparison, this article next discusses 
                                                          
 12. Louis Columbus, Internet of Things Market to Reach $267B by 2020, 
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus 
/2017/01/29/internet-of-things-market-to-reach-267b-by-2020/#7d16f853609b. 
 13. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things” 
Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917. 
 14. Press Release, IHS Markit, Number of Connected IoT Devices Will 
Surge to 125 Billion by 2030, IHS Markit Says (October 24, 2017), 
http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/number-connected-iot-devices-will-
surge-125-billion-2030-ihs-markit-says. 
 15. Id. 
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actions taken by the European Union, the Article 29 Working 
Party,16 and European organizations to address security and 
privacy concerns related to the IoT. Whereas the United States 
takes a sectoral approach to privacy, with laws and regulations 
designed to address specific industries, the EU prefers an 
omnibus approach to privacy through implementation of an 
overarching, blanket law regulating privacy consistently across 
industries, providing certain rights to EU citizens regardless of 
context.17 More specifically, this article addresses how two major 
EU regulations—the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) and the ePrivacy Regulation—implicate the IoT, 
especially guidelines aiming to mitigate concerns regarding the 
collection of EU individuals’ personal data and the vulnerability 
of such data. 
Finally, this article discusses who may be liable in the event 
of an IoT device malfunction or a cyberattack during which 
personal data stored on the device or a larger network is stolen. 
Although this remains an unanswered question in the courts, 
this article points to three areas of law and enforcement that 
suggest how liability may be determined and handled, including 
(1) enforcement actions by the FTC related to IoT devices, (2) 
End User License Agreements (EULAs) and product liability 
law, and (3) additional avenues, beyond product liability, that 
consumers may claim compensation for damages related to IoT 
devices, including some state data breach statutes. 
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
RAISED BY THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
In order to understand the reasons behind regulation of the 
IoT, as well as potential liability, it is necessary to consider both 
the security and the privacy concerns associated with the 
devices. Experts warn that IoT devices will continue to be subject 
to cyberattacks in 2018, similar to the May 2017 WannaCry 
                                                          
 16. See infra note 247. 
 17. Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to 
Privacy Law, TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com 
/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/; see also Natasha Singer, Data 
Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-
laws-an-ocean-apart.html. 
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attack18 and the October 2016 Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks19 that targeted computer systems and the IoT, 
worldwide. These same experts argue that what constitutes 
reasonable security has not been clearly defined,20 potentially 
leading to the “security crisis of 2018.”21 
Similarly, experts maintain that privacy concerns 
associated with the IoT will continue throughout 2018 because 
the industry lacks proper oversight regarding personal data 
collected by IoT devices.22 Of particular concern, many IoT 
devices collect “extremely sensitive data,” including health data 
and data collected from children’s toys, despite efforts by the 
FTC and FBI to alert consumers to these potential privacy 
issues.23 
A. SECURITY ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
In April 2017, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), an independent agency 
within the U.S. Department of Commerce, noted that the 
“[s]ecurity of [IoT] devices is increasingly important to the 
security and safety of consumers, businesses, and others.”24 The 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) warns that the 
security issues associated with IoT devices arise because they 
are connected to the internet, making them vulnerable to 
                                                          
 18. Ian Sherr, WannaCry Ransomware: Everything You Need to Know, 
CNET (May 19, 2017, 12:29 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/wannacry-
wannacrypt-uiwix-ransomware-everything-you-need-to-know/. 
 19. What Is a DDoS Attack?, DIGITAL ATTACK MAP, https://www 
.digitalattackmap.com/understanding-ddos/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); see also 
Margaret Rouse, Definition: Disrupted Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack, 
TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributed-
denial-of-service-attack. 
 20. Jimmy H. Koo, Dumb Devices Smarten Up, Widening Data Security 
Enforcement Net, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg Law, New York, 
N.Y.) Jan. 8, 2018, at 1. 
 21. Nick Ismail, The Internet of Things: The Security Crisis of 2018?, INFO. 
AGE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.information-age.com/internet-things-security-
crisis-123470475/. 
 22. Bree Fowler, Gifts That Snoop? The Internet of Things Is Wrapped in 
Privacy Concerns, CONSUMER REPS. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www 
.consumerreports.org/internet-of-things/gifts-that-snoop-internet-of-things-
privacy-concerns/. 
 23. Id. 
 24. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., COMMUNICATING IOT DEVICE 
SECURITY UPDATE CAPABILITY TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY FOR 
CONSUMERS (2017). 
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cyberattacks that can be used to gain access to an entire 
network.25 Complicating matters, most computer systems 
prevent against, or mitigate, cyberattacks through patches via 
regular updates.26 However, many IoT devices have not been 
designed to use such patches in their software, leaving security 
issues unresolved.27 
Furthermore, some IoT devices utilize cloud storage services 
that use remote servers to store data. Such “splitting control” 
over the device and the data leaves both prone to cyberattacks 
that may compromise the security of the devices and the data.28 
However, most IoT devices do not send collected data through 
networks to a centralized cloud server because of limited power, 
as well as limited connectivity and bandwidth.29 Instead, most 
IoT devices utilize “fog computing,” meaning the device itself or 
a nearby router are used to analyze and process the sensor 
data.30 This decentralized IoT architecture, with data being 
stored and secured locally, prevents some of the security 
concerns associated with cloud storage;31 however, it does not 
completely alleviate security issues, which are discussed below. 
In November 2013, the FTC held a workshop, titled “The 
Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World,” 
during which panelists from government, industry, and 
consumer groups discussed a variety of issues related to IoT.32 
In a January 2015 report stemming from the workshop, the FTC 
detailed both the benefits and the risks of the IoT, including 
security concerns.33 In particular, the FTC highlighted three 
potential threats to consumers.34 First, IoT devices “enabl[e] 
unauthorized access and misuse of personal information” by 
                                                          
 25. Internet of Things (IoT), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/internet/iot/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rhys Dipshan, The IoT Ambiguity: Secure Architecture, Vulnerable 
Data, LEGALTECH NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews 
/sites/legaltechnews/2018/02/02/the-iot-ambiguity-secure-architecture-
vulnerable-data/. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8. 
 33. Id. at iii. 
 34. Id. at ii. 
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intruders and hackers gaining access to the data.35 Second, IoT 
devices “facilitat[e] attacks on other systems,” such as the 
network to which the IoT device is connected.36 Finally, IoT 
devices may “create risks to physical safety in some cases.”37 For 
example, one participant at the FTC workshop declared that he 
had hacked insulin pumps, allowing him to change the settings 
remotely to stop the machines.38 A different participant claimed 
that he could gain remote access to a car’s internal computer 
network, allowing him to control the engine and braking 
systems.39 
In the years since the report was published, IoT devices 
have been subject to ransomware and Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks, which many experts expect to continue, 
and increase, throughout 2018.40 A ransomware attack occurs 
when hackers use a virus to infect a computer and to encrypt all 
of its data, making the data inaccessible.41 The hackers then 
demand a ransom from the affected computer user to decrypt the 
data.42 If the computer user fails to pay the ransom within a 
certain amount of time, the virus destroys the files.43 In 2017, 
security company Symantec reported that ransomware attacks 
jumped to 483,800 incidents in 2016, an increase of more than 
one-third compared to 2015.44 By contrast, a DDoS attack “is an 
attempt to make an online service unavailable by overwhelming 
it with traffic from multiple sources.”45 The cybercriminal begins 
a DDoS attack by exploiting the vulnerability of just one device, 
                                                          
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 12. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; see also Ben Dickson, Why IoT Security Is So Critical, TECHCRUNCH 
(Oct. 24, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/24/why-iot-security-is-so-
critical/ (“In another development, it was proven that Internet-connected cars 
can be compromised, as well, and hackers can carry out any number of malicious 
activities, including taking control of the entertainment system, unlocking the 
doors or even shutting down the car in motion.”). 
 40. Ismail, supra note 21; see also Chris Preimesberger, Predictions 2018: 
Internet of Things Will Expand as Threat Vector, EWEEK (Dec. 28, 2017), 
http://www.eweek.com/security/predictions-2018-internet-of-things-will-
expand-as-threat-vector. 
 41. Sherr, supra note 18. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. What Is a DDoS Attack?, supra note 19; see also Rouse, supra note 19. 
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making it the DDoS “master,” which then identifies other 
vulnerable devices, networks, and systems.46 
One example of a large ransomware attack targeting 
internet and computer systems is the virus named WannaCry.47 
In May 2017, hackers targeted computers running the Microsoft 
Windows operating system by encrypting data and subsequently 
demanding ransom payments.48 The WannaCry attack affected 
thousands of computers in more than 150 countries.49 One of the 
more serious effects of the attack was the targeting of sixteen 
hospitals across the United Kingdom, leading to the cancellation 
of appointments and non-urgent operations at some locations.50 
The UK National Health Service stated that although the attack 
severely affected operations at the hospitals, particularly 
freezing computer operations running on an outdated Windows 
operating system, there was no indication that any patient data 
had been compromised.51 The global financial and economic 
damage caused by WannaCry approached billions of dollars, 
making it one of the most damaging ransomware incidents in 
history.52 
An example of a large-scale DDoS attack took place in 
October 2016 and directly targeted IoT devices. On October 26, 
2016, The Guardian, among other media outlets, reported that 
the DDoS attack affected a large portion of the U.S. internet by 
                                                          
 46. Rouse, supra note 19. 
 47. Jane E. Kirtley, Global Privacy and Data Protection—2017, in 
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 365, 
440 (2017). 
 48. Timothy B. Lee, The WannaCry Ransomware Attack Was Temporarily 
Halted. But It’s Not Over Yet, VOX (May 15, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox 
.com/new-money/2017/5/15/15641196/wannacry-ransomware-windows-xp. 
 49. Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: What We Know Monday, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (May 15, 2017, 2:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/the two-
way/2017/05/15/528451534/wannacry-ransomware-what-we-know-monday. 
 50. Russell Brandom, UK Hospitals Hit with Massive Ransomware Attack, 
VERGE (May 12, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/12 
/15630354/nhs-hospitals-ransomware-hack-wannacry-bitcoin; see also Denis 
Campbell & Haroon Siddique, Operations Cancelled as Hunt Accused of 
Ignoring Cyber-Attack Warnings, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 8:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/15/warning-of-nhs-cyber-
attack-was-not-acted-on-cybersecurity (“Operations and hospital clinic 
appointments due to take place on Tuesday have been cancelled . . . .”). 
 51. Brandom, supra note 50. 
 52. Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach 
$4 Billion, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/. 
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infecting a network of computers with Mirai, malware meant to 
bombard a server with so much traffic that it eventually 
collapses.53 The servers belonged to Dyn, “a company that is a 
major provider of DNS services to other companies.”54 The 
Guardian reported that the attack affected the function of 
several websites “including Twitter, the Guardian, Netflix, 
Reddit, CNN and many others in Europe and the US.”55 
According to WeLiveSecurity, a publication of IT security 
company ESET, the DDoS attacks were “made possible by the 
large number of unsecured internet-connected digital devices, 
such as home routers and surveillance cameras.”56 The attacks 
infected thousands of IoT devices with the Mirai malware in 
order to find additional unsecured devices.57 The result was the 
formation of a botnet, a group of hijacked Internet-connected 
private devices controlled remotely without the device’s owner’s 
consent or knowledge.58 Experts also pointed to default 
passwords of IoT devices as another reason for the DDoS attack. 
WeLiveSecurity explained that “anyone placing [a smart] device 
on the internet without first changing the default password is, 
in effect, enabling attacks of the type witnessed on October 21.”59 
A 2017 report by Corero Network Security, which provides 
DDoS protection and mitigation for its clients, found that in Q3 
of 2017, organizations faced an average of 237 DDoS attack 
attempts per month, marking a 35% increase from Q2, and a 
91% increase from Q1.60 Researchers have argued that one 
                                                          
 53. Stephen Cobb, 10 Things to Know About the October 21 IoT DDoS 
Attacks, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://www.welivesecurity 
.com/2016/10/24/10-things-know-october-21-iot-ddos-attacks/; see also Nicky 
Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in History, 
Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet (discussing the Mirai 
botnet and its role in the attack). 
 54. Cobb, supra note 53. 
 55. Woolf, supra note 53. 
 56. Cobb, supra note 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; see also Botnet DDoS Attacks, INCAPSULA, https://www.incapsula 
.com/ddos/botnet-ddos.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (defining botnet). 
 59. Cobb, supra note 53. 
 60. Alison DeNisco Rayome, DDoS Attacks Increased 91% in 2017 Thanks 
to IoT, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com 
/article/ddos-attacks-increased-91-in-2017-thanks-to-iot/; see also CORERO & 
GTT, CORERO & GTT DDOS TRENDS REPORT: Q2–Q3 2017, 3 (2017), 
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reason for the increase is the growing implementation of IoT 
devices, many of which remain unsecured.61 
More generally, in a 2017 survey, strategic consulting firm 
Altman Vilandrie & Company found that nearly half of U.S. 
companies using an IoT network were hit by a security breach.62 
The survey polled 400 IT executives across nineteen industries, 
with 48% reporting that they had experienced a breach.63 
Furthermore, experts predict that small businesses may become 
a preferred target of hackers throughout 2018.64 Jason J. Hogg, 
CEO of Aon Cyber Solutions, anticipates that one of the largest 
targets for IoT hacking in 2018 will be small businesses that use 
this technology because hackers “[target] IoT [devices] as a pivot 
point to enter systems and take control of physical operations.”65 
Successful attacks on small businesses can create a domino 
effect: damaging larger corporations that receive their services.66 
However, despite all these security concerns, Bloomberg 
Intelligence analyst Jawahar Hingorani observes that 
companies are “often playing catch-up” to keep up with old and 
new security problems.67 Bloomberg BNA adds that what 
constitutes reasonable security, whether defined by the FTC or 
private companies, “remains undefined.”68 In its “Information 
Age” blog, digital media company Vitesse Media predicts that 
IoT may be the “security crisis of 2018,” especially if companies 
                                                          
https://www.gtt.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Corero-Q2-Q3-Trend-
Reports.pdf (establishing quoted statistics). 
 61. Rayome, supra note 60. 
 62. Larry Karisny, IoT Is Changing the Cybersecurity Industry, GOV’T 
TECH. (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/security/IoT-Is-Changing-the-
Cybersecurity-Industry.html; see also Ken Briodagh, New Survey Says Half of 
US Companies Using IoT Have Been Breached, IOT EVOLUTION (June 1, 2017), 
http://www.iotevolutionworld.com/iot/articles/432498-new-survey-says-half-us-
companies-using-iot.htm (discussing the 2017 survey). 
 63. Briodagh, supra note 62. 
 64. AON, 2018 CYBERSECURITY PREDICTIONS: A SHIFT TO MANAGING 
CYBER AS AN ENTERPRISE RISK 13 (2018), https://www.strozfriedberg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Cybersecurity-Predictions-Report-Aon-Cyber-
Solutions.pdf; see also Rob Starr, Hackers Will Target Small Business Through 
the Internet of Things in 2018, New Report Says, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://smallbiztrends.com/2018/01/2018-cybersecurity-predictions.html 
(referencing the Aon report’s finding that hackers will target small businesses 
that use IoT technology in 2018). 
 65. Starr, supra note 64. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Koo, supra note 20. 
 68. Id. 
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and organizations, as well as federal agencies, do not work to 
update security measures, policies, and potential solutions.69 
B. PRIVACY ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
In its 2015 report, the FTC also addressed privacy concerns 
associated with IoT devices: that they directly collect sensitive 
information, including precise geolocation, financial account 
numbers, health information, and more.70 Furthermore, the IoT 
involves large aggregations of data.71 The FTC reported that 
approximately 10,000 households using a single company’s IoT 
home automation product can collectively “generate 150 million 
discrete data points a day,”72 or about “one data point every six 
seconds for each household.”73 The creation of “[s]uch a massive 
volume of granular data allows those with,” or without, “access 
to the data to perform analyses . . . [impossible] with less rich 
data sets.”74 Another privacy concern raised by the FTC is that 
a manufacturer, cybercriminal, or even law enforcement, could 
remotely “eavesdrop” on an individual’s home, a school, a 
hospital, or other private areas, leading to warrantless 
surveillance or illegal searches and recordings in violation of 
common law, privacy, and Fourth Amendment rights.75 
Two types of “extremely sensitive” personal data have been 
highlighted as areas of particular concern moving forward: 
health data and data collected by children’s toys. Regarding 
health data, Jimmy Koo in Bloomberg BNA observes that 
devices such as wearable fitness trackers that connect to the 
internet collect “extremely sensitive” health data about 
individuals’ personal wellness.76 The FTC contended in 2015 
that such information could be used by insurance companies to 
decide whether to preemptively raise or lower individuals’ 
insurance costs or deductible.77 
Med Device Online, an online resource for manufacturers in 
medical device design, suggests that healthcare data, including 
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medical records and results from hospital equipment such as 
MRI and X-ray machines, is also vulnerable as IoT medical 
devices become increasingly common in hospitals and the 
healthcare industry.78 IBM’s “2016 Cyber Security Intelligence 
Index” found that healthcare was the top industry cyberattacked 
in 2015,79 including by the WannaCry attack. Studies from 2017 
also suggest that the healthcare industry remains a major 
target, with organizations facing a new cyberattack every two 
weeks.80 
The second area receiving particular attention is children’s 
toys and personal data. CBS News contributor and Wired 
magazine editor-in-chief Nicholas Thompson asserts that there 
is “a real discrepancy between the privacy protections built into 
most internet-connected toys and the privacy protections that 
you want for your children” largely because it is hard to update 
children’s toys.81 Thompson drew particular attention to toys 
that have microphones and cameras, suggesting they can be 
used by hackers to eavesdrop, as has happened with baby 
monitors.82 Children’s toys that collect information such as 
names, email addresses, and home addresses are also vulnerable 
to hacking, especially if the information is stored in the cloud.83 
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 83. See Why You Should Be “Wary” of Gifting an Internet-Connected Smart 
Toy, supra note 81 (“‘We’ve had internet-connected toys that store information 
on the cloud like your child’s voice that can then be hacked.’ There have also 
been hacks that exposed personal data like names, email and home addresses.”). 
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He added that children “don’t have defenses against privacy 
invasions because they haven’t learned these things.”84 
These privacy concerns prompted toy company Mattel, the 
FTC, and the FBI in 2017 to take precautionary actions related 
to children’s IoT toys. First, on October 4, 2017, Mattel 
announced that it had canceled plans to sell “Aristotle,” a smart 
device aimed at young children, amidst growing security and 
privacy concerns related to the device.85 Mattel had introduced 
the device in January 2017, which combined a smart speaker 
with a digital assistant functionality and connected camera.86 A 
May 2017 Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (CCFC) 
petition pointed out that although the device was intended to 
soothe a crying baby with “nightlights, lullabies, and sleep 
sounds,” it would also collect and store data about a child’s 
activity.87 Further, according to the petition, it would “connect[] 
to other apps and online retailers, which means that data may 
be shared with those partner corporations, which may use it to 
target the marketing of other products to young children and 
their parents.”88 In a statement, a spokeswoman for Mattel said 
that the decision not to sell Aristotle was prompted by Sven 
Gerjets, the company’s new chief technology officer, who 
conducted a review of the Aristotle product and decided that it 
did not “fully align with Mattel’s new technology strategy . . . .”89 
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. James Vincent, Mattel Cancels AI Babysitter After Privacy Complaints, 
VERGE (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/5/16430822/mattel-
aristotle-ai-child-monitor-canceled. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Stop Mattel’s Aristotle from Trading Children’s Privacy for Profit, CCFC 
https://org.salsalabs.com/o/621/p/dia/action4/common/public/?action_KEY=217
18; see also Letter from Josh Golin & Michael O’Heaney, Executive Directors, 
Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, to Margaret Georgiadis, CEO, 
Mattel, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites 
/default/files/Letter%20to%20Mattel.pdf. 
 88. Stop Mattel’s Aristotle from Trading Children’s Privacy for Profit, supra 
note 87. 
 89. Hayley Tsukayama, Mattel Has Canceled Plans for a Kid-Focused AI 
Device that Drew Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/04/mattel-has-
an-ai-device-to-soothe-babies-experts-are-begging-them-not-to-sell-
it/?utm_term=.75fb93da0d12. 
2018] REWRITING THE “BOOK OF THE MACHINE” 469 
 
Second, on June 21, 2017, the FTC published a press 
release, “FTC Updates COPPA Compliance Plan for Business,”90 
which described how the FTC updated its Six Step Compliance 
Plan for businesses regarding the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).91 Section 6502(a) of COPPA, 
titled “Regulation of unfair and deceptive acts and practices in 
connection with collection and use of personal information from 
and about children on the Internet,” makes it “unlawful for an 
operator of a website or online service directed to children, or 
any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting 
personal information from a child, to collect personal 
information from a child in a manner that violates the 
regulations” of the statute.92 
The main revision of the FTC’s compliance plan directed 
vendors to initially “Determine if Your Company is a Website or 
Online Service that Collects Personal Information from Kids 
Under 13,” and the revision now included “connected toys or 
other Internet of Things devices” under the definition of 
“Website or online service.”93 Additionally, the FTC added two 
ways that companies could obtain parents’ permission before 
collecting children’s personal information: “asking knowledge-
based authentication questions and using facial recognition to 
get a match with a verified photo ID.”94 
On July 17, 2017, the FBI published a public service 
announcement, which also addressed “privacy and contact 
concerns for children” in relation to IoT toys.95 The FBI alert 
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(2012). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (2012). 
 93. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan 
for Your Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-
step-compliance. 
 94. Cohen & Magee, supra note 90. 
 95. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ALERT NO. I-071717 (REVISED)-PSA, 
CONSUMER NOTICE: INTERNET-CONNECTED TOYS COULD PRESENT PRIVACY 
470 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
encouraged consumers to “consider cyber security prior to 
introducing smart, interactive, internet-connected toys into 
their homes or trusted environments,” citing the FTC’s updated 
compliance plan.96 According to the FBI, the toys “typically 
contain sensors, microphones, cameras, data storage 
components, and other multimedia capabilities—including 
speech recognition and GPS options” and can connect to the 
Internet, which means the toys “could put the privacy and safety 
of children at risk due to the large amount of personal 
information that may be unwittingly disclosed.”97 The alert also 
provided recommendations for families regarding IoT toys, 
including “[c]arefully read disclosures and privacy policies” and 
“[c]losely monitor children’s activity with the toys (such as 
conversations and voice recordings) through the toy’s partner 
parent application,” among other recommendations.98 
Despite these actions by Mattel, the FTC, and the FBI, 
privacy concerns remain for children’s toys as well as other IoT 
devices. Security and privacy experts warn that there is still 
“little oversight” of the data collected by the devices and how 
they are protected from hackers and cyberattacks.99 
Additionally, even if personal information is kept secure and 
private by IoT companies, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the 
Northern District of California Hanley Chew notes that a law 
enforcement or government official needs only to obtain a 
subpoena to access IoT data because it can be interpreted as 
falling under “non-content” information as defined in the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.100 Subpoenas 
do not require judicial approval, unlike search warrants, making 
it easier for the police or federal agencies to obtain information 
from IoT devices.101 Thus, questions remain about what data law 
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enforcement or government agencies will be able to access, 
whether through a subpoena or a search warrant.102 
III. REGULATION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
On January 4, 2018, Bloomberg Law contended that despite 
significant security and privacy concerns, IoT devices and data 
remain largely unregulated, with “no specific law or regulation 
governing how this data is used or collected.”103 However, the 
federal government, as well as private companies, have recently 
undertaken stronger measures to address the security and 
privacy issues related to IoT devices. Paul Rosenzweig, the 
founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, suggests that the 
“most significant regulatory push in the United States” will 
involve the IoT, with regulatory agencies imposing security and 
privacy requirements.104 
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
In light of the security and privacy concerns associated with 
IoT devices, experts have called on the federal government, 
including federal agencies and Congress, to take a more active 
role in coordinating security standards.105 Frost and Sullivan 
IoT research director Dilip Sarangan contends that because the 
responsibility of IoT privacy and security falls upon several 
actors in the IoT industry, including manufacturers, network 
providers, software developers, and others, it is difficult for the 
industry to develop industry-wide standards.106 He further 
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explains that IoT implementation has several moving parts that 
may be administered by multiple different organizations and 
third parties.107 
From 2016 through January 2018, the FTC, National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), four 
U.S. Senators, and four U.S. Representatives, in association 
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), took steps to 
address IoT privacy and security concerns. First, the FTC was 
involved in several legal disputes connected to the IoT and 
security.108 As discussed in Section II.B, the FTC also updated 
its compliance plan regarding COPPA to include IoT devices, 
with the FBI sending an alert related to similar concerns.109 
Second, in a July 18, 2017 meeting, a public-private sector 
working group (“Working Group”) convened by the NTIA, 
finalized a guidance document drafted in April 2017 addressing 
how manufacturers should communicate information to 
consumers about security updates for IoT devices.110 
Third, on August 1, 2017, four U.S. Senators introduced a 
bipartisan bill aiming to improve the cybersecurity of IoT devices 
supplied by vendors to the U.S. government.111 The legislation 
contained several provisions, including requirements that 
vendors “ensure [the] devices are patchable, rely on industry 
standard protocols, do not use hard-coded passwords, and do not 
contain any known security vulnerabilities.”112 
Finally, on October 5, 2017, Rep. David Trott (R-Mich.) 
introduced the “Internet of Medical Things Resilience 
Partnership Act of 2017.”113 The legislation aimed to “establish 
a working group of public and private entities led by the Food 
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and Drug Administration to recommend voluntary frameworks 
and guidelines to increase the security and resilience of Internet 
of Medical Things devices, and for other purposes.”114 
1. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Actions 
Since convening the Working Group in 2013, the FTC has 
viewed IoT security as a priority.115 In addition to explaining the 
benefits and risks of the IoT in its 2015 report, the FTC provided 
several recommendations for best practices businesses can 
implement in order to protect consumers’ privacy and security, 
including that manufacturers adopt a “security by design 
approach” by building security into an IoT device.116 The FTC 
supported not only providing notice to consumers about what 
data is being collected, but also giving them a choice of how their 
data is collected and shared.117 The FTC also explained how it 
aimed to ensure that IoT manufacturers considered security and 
privacy.118 Finally, the report emphasized the need to develop 
self-regulatory programs to encourage the adoption of privacy- 
and security-sensitive practices.119 
Another action by the FTC regarding IoT privacy and 
security was a contest launched in January 2017 “seeking tools 
to help consumers protect the security of their [IoT] devices.”120 
On July 26, 2017, the agency announced that a mobile app 
developed by Steve Castle, a New Hampshire software 
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developer, had won the $25,000 top prize.121 According to a press 
release by the FTC, the app is intended to 
help users manage the IoT devices in their home. It would enable 
users with limited technical expertise to scan their home Wi-Fi and 
Bluetooth networks to identify and inventory connected devices. It 
would flag devices with out-of-date software and other common 
vulnerabilities and provide instructions on how to update each 
device’s software and fix other vulnerabilities.122 
Apart from the report and contest, the FTC has also reached 
settlements with several companies in IoT related cases, 
including ASUSTeK Computer Inc. (ASUS), D-Link Systems, 
Inc. (D-Link), Lenovo Group Ltd. (Lenovo), Vizio Inc. (Vizio), and 
VTech.123 
a. ASUSTeK Computer Inc. 
On February 23, 2016, the FTC announced that it had 
reached a settlement with Taiwan-based computer hardware 
maker ASUS after the agency contended that security flaws in 
its routers put the home networks of hundreds of thousands of 
consumers at risk.124 According to the FTC’s complaint, ASUS 
introduced a feature known as AiCloud on its routers in August 
2012, labeling it as a “private personal cloud for selective file 
sharing” allowing “indefinite storage and increased privacy.”125 
The FTC alleged that AiCloud had “multiple vulnerabilities that 
would allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to consumers’ 
files and router login credentials.”126 The FTC further alleged 
that ASUS failed to provide notice to consumers that the 
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vulnerabilities existed, nor had it advised consumers how to 
disable AiCloud features that would mitigate the 
vulnerabilities.127 
ASUS also introduced another cloud storage feature called 
AiDisk, which enabled individuals to remotely access files on a 
USB storage device attached to the router.128 Regarding this 
feature, the FTC alleged that it had an “insecure design” because 
default settings provided “anyone on the internet with 
unauthenticated access to all of the files saved on the consumer’s 
USB storage device.”129 ASUS again failed to notify consumers 
about the security concerns for nearly a year.130 The complaint 
added several additional vulnerabilities of ASUS products.131 
In July 2016, the FTC finalized the settlement, which 
required ASUS to establish and maintain a comprehensive 
security program subject to independent audits for the next 20 
years, as well as to notify consumers about software updates or 
other steps to protect themselves from security flaws.132 The 
agency called the settlement part of an “ongoing effort to ensure 
that companies secure the software and devices that they 
provide to consumers.”133 
b. D-Link Systems, Inc. 
On January 5, 2017, the FTC filed a complaint seeking a 
permanent injunction and other equitable relief against D-Link 
Corporation and D-Link Systems, Inc. (collectively “D-Link”) in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, 
San Francisco Division, alleging that D-Link’s internet cameras 
and routers contained inadequate security measures.134 
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According to the FTC’s complaint, Taiwan-based D-Link 
Corporation “directed its activities to the United States by 
designing, developing, marketing, and manufacturing routers, 
Internet-protocol (‘IP’) cameras, and related software and 
services, intended for use by consumers throughout the United 
States.”135 D-Link Systems, Inc., the corporation’s U.S. 
subsidiary, “advertised, marketed, distributed, or sold routers, 
IP cameras, and related software and services, intended for use 
by consumers throughout the United States.” 136 
The FTC alleged that D-Link engaged “in unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices”137 because the company “[failed] to 
take reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet-protocol 
cameras they designed for, marketed, and sold to United States 
consumers.”138 Furthermore, the FTC argued that D-Link “failed 
to take reasonable steps to protect their routers and IP cameras 
from widely known and reasonably foreseeable risks of 
unauthorized access[.]”139 Consequently, the FTC contended 
that these failures led to “thousands” of routers and cameras 
being vulnerable to cyberattacks, putting consumers’ personal 
information and local networks at risk,140 and requested 
injunctive relief, though the agency did not allege that any 
personal data had been exposed.141 
However, on September 25, 2017, Bloomberg BNA reported 
that the FTC would have to refile some of its claims related to 
security vulnerabilities and misleading advertising after a 
federal judge dismissed three of the six unfairness claims 
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stemming from the company’s alleged lax router security. 142 On 
September 20, 2017, Consumerist reported that the dismissal 
stemmed from the FTC’s lack of proof to substantiate half of its 
claims.143 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California Judge James Donato wrote: 
The FTC does not allege any actual consumer injury in the form of a 
monetary loss or an actual incident where sensitive personal data was 
accessed or exposed. Instead, the FTC relies solely on the likelihood 
that DLS put consumers at “risk” . . . .144 That is effectively the sum 
total of the harm allegations, and they make out a mere possibility of 
injury at best. The FTC does not identify a single incident where a 
consumer’s financial, medical or other sensitive personal information 
has been accessed, exposed or misused in any way . . . . The absence 
of any concrete facts makes it just as possible that [the] devices are 
not likely to substantially harm consumers, and the FTC cannot rely 
on wholly conclusory allegations about potential injury to tilt the 
balance in its favor.145 
Bloomberg BNA reported on January 24, 2018 that the FTC 
had not refiled the dismissed claims, but the litigation over the 
remaining charges remained ongoing.146 
c. Lenovo Group Ltd. 
On September 5, 2017, Lenovo agreed to no-fault 
settlements with the FTC and 32 states amidst allegations by 
the FTC that the ad software it installed had compromised users’ 
web security and invaded their privacy.147 The case arose in 2014 
when Lenovo began selling laptops to U.S. consumers that came 
with a preinstalled software program called VisualDiscovery.148 
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at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017). 
 146. Koo, supra note 123. 
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The FTC alleged that the software “interfered with how a user’s 
browser interacted with websites and created serious security 
vulnerabilities” because it had access to “all of a consumer’s 
sensitive personal information transmitted over the Internet, 
including login credentials, Social Security numbers, medical 
information, and financial and payment information.”149 
Furthermore, problems with the software meant consumers’ 
browsers could not warn users when they visited malicious 
websites with invalid digital certificates, according to the FTC 
complaint.150 
As part of the FTC settlement, Lenovo agreed not to 
misrepresent any feature of installed software and to get 
affirmative user consent before installing such software, as well 
as provide an opt-out mechanism before loading similar 
software. The company was also required to implement and 
maintain a comprehensive data security software program for 
any software it installs.151 Under the separate state agreement, 
Lenovo agreed to pay 32 State Attorney Generals $3.5 million.152 
d. Vizio Inc. 
On February 6, 2017, Vizio agreed to pay $2.2 million to 
settle a case with the FTC and the New Jersey attorney general’s 
office.153 According to the FTC’s February 2014 complaint, Vizio 
manufactured smart TVs that had a “Smart Interactivity” 
                                                          
Compromised Online Security (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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feature, which “enables program offers and suggestions.”154 
However, the FTC alleged that Vizio failed to inform consumers 
that the feature also enabled the collection of their viewing 
data.155 The complaint further alleged that Vizio had appended 
specific demographic information to the viewing data, such as 
sex, age, income, marital status, household size, education level, 
home ownership, and household value, before selling the data to 
third parties.156 The FTC called Vizio’s data tracking unfair and 
deceptive, because it was done without users’ consent.157 
Following the settlement, an order by U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California Judge Josephine Staton 
required Vizio to “prominently disclose and obtain affirmative 
express consent for its data collection and sharing practices.”158 
The order also required Vizio to delete data collected before 
March 1, 2016, and to implement a comprehensive data privacy 
program and biennial assessments of that program.159 
e. VTech 
On January 8, 2018, the FTC also reached a settlement in a 
case regarding children’s toys and COPPA.160 The agency 
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Connected Toys Settlement Action, DATA PRIV. MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2017), 
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reached a $650,000 settlement with VTech, which “develop[s] a 
number of products and services for children,” including portable 
devices known as “electronic learning products” or “ELPs.”161 
The FTC contended in its complaint that VTech is therefore 
subject to COPPA, which applies to any operator of a commercial 
website or online service directed to children that collects, uses, 
and/or discloses their personal information.162 COPPA requires 
that such companies follow steps to ensure children’s 
information is protected, which includes disclosing to parents 
how the data is used.163 
The main action of the litigation concerned Kid Connect, a 
mobile application that allows children to communicate with 
other children after parents or other adults download and 
register the app.164 The FTC alleged that VTech failed to take 
several steps required by COPPA, including failing to provide a 
link to their privacy policy in each area where the app collected 
personal information.165 VTech also failed to “develop, 
implement, or maintain a comprehensive information security 
program” and “implement adequate safeguards and security 
measures,” among several other allegations.166 
The complaint also claimed that VTech learned in 
November 2015 that a hacker had gained remote access to the 
company’s computer network through “commonly known and 
reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities,” and withdrew personal 
information from several IoT devices and apps, including Kid 
Connect.167 Although VTech stored passwords and children’s 
photos and audio files in an encrypted format, the hacker gained 
access to a database that contained the decryption keys, which 
would have allowed the cybercriminal to access the information. 
It was not until a journalist approached the company that it 
learned about the hack.168 Furthermore, the FTC alleged that 
although VTech continued to assert in its privacy policy that 
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most personal information was encrypted, in fact, none of it was 
actually encrypted.169 
As part of its settlement with the FTC, VTech was 
“permanently prohibited from violating COPPA in the future 
and from misrepresenting its security and privacy practices.”170 
The company was also required to implement a comprehensive 
data security program subject to independent audits for 20 
years.171 The litigation against VTech was one of over 20 COPPA 
cases brought by the FTC since 2000 and provided an additional 
example of how federal agencies, including the FTC and FBI, 
have addressed security and privacy of children’s IoT devices 
under COPPA.172 
2. National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration 
On April 25, 2017, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), an independent agency 
within the U.S. Department of Commerce, released a report 
titled “Communicating IoT Device Security Update Capability to 
Improve Transparency for Consumers.”173 Drafted by a public-
private sector working group (“Working Group”) convened by the 
NTIA, the document addressed how IoT companies, particularly 
manufacturers, should communicate security updates for IoT 
devices. In a July 18 meeting, the NTIA Working Group 
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 170. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 160. 
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NTIA green paper titled “Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of 
Things.”). 
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published the final version of its guidance document after 
reaching a consensus.174 
The first version of the document stated that security 
updates to IoT devices “are a key way to protect IoT devices when 
vulnerabilities are discovered and attacks evolve, though the 
method and capability of IoT devices to receive security updates 
varies across devices, services, and deployments.”175 
Additionally, the document explained that IoT consumers “may 
desire basic information about their devices’ security 
capabilities, particularly with regard to whether and how 
devices receive security updates.”176 The report added, “[t]here 
is also interest on the part of many policymakers and 
technologists for promoting transparency for consumers about 
the security needs and capabilities of internet-enabled 
devices.”177 
Next, the NTIA document outlined information “that 
manufacturers can communicate to better inform consumers 
and the marketplace about IoT devices’ capability to receive 
security updates . . . .”178 The information was divided into two 
categories: “key elements” and “additional considerations.”179 
The first key element recommended that businesses describe 
“whether the [IoT] device is capable of receiving security 
updates.”180 Second, the report recommended that IoT 
companies provide a “[s]ummary of how the device receives 
security updates,” including whether the device can receive 
automatic updates and, if not, “[w]hat user action is required to 
ensure the device is updated correctly and in a timely 
fashion?”181 The final key element urged manufacturers to 
“[d]escribe the anticipated timeline for the end of security 
update support” because “routine security updates typically 
[end] as a device or software reaches the end of its lifecycle.”182 
Thus, it “may be helpful to describe how long . . . consumers 
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[can] expect, at a minimum, the device to receive security 
updates.”183 
Turning to “additional considerations,” the NTIA first 
recommended that IoT companies “[d]escribe how the user is 
notified about security updates,” through a notification 
appearing on the IoT device or through an email.184 Second, the 
document suggested that companies make clear “what happens 
when the device no longer receives security update support.”185 
Finally, the Working Group suggested that IoT manufacturers 
describe how they ensure that security updates themselves are 
secure.186 
On June 19, 2017, the FTC provided public comments for 
the NTIA recommendations.187 The FTC emphasized the 
importance of consumers being provided “clear information 
about whether, how, for how long, and at what cost their IoT 
devices will receive security support,” in light of the growing 
importance of “[ensuring IoT] devices are reasonably secure.”188 
In so doing, the FTC argued, IoT companies “can benefit 
consumers, foster competition, and promote innovation in 
security.”189 The FTC also provided a series of recommendations 
regarding the “key elements” and the “additional elements” 
discussed by the Working Group.190 
In a virtual meeting held on July 18, 2017, the NTIA 
Working Group finalized its IoT document.191 The completed 
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document noted that it “reflects input and comments on earlier 
draft versions that were received from various stakeholders 
participating in the NTIA’s multistakeholder process, including 
comments provided by the Federal Trade Commission.”192 One 
particular change was the addition of the phrase “for when 
support begins or ends (e.g. Jan. 1, 2025, or one year after date 
of registration)” regarding the “anticipated timeline” provided by 
IoT manufacturers.193 Second, the final document updated the 
recommendation that manufacturers describe “how the user is 
notified about security updates” to include an “optional 
subscription service offering affirmative notifications” and “the 
timing of updates, such as if updates are available on a regular 
schedule.”194 The Working Group emphasized that the 
guidelines “[were] not meant to supersede regulation or serve as 
a legal standard” but instead “to identify and consolidate critical 
points it recommends manufacturers weigh as they develop IoT 
devices.”195 
3. U.S. Senate Bill 
On August 1, 2017, four U.S. Senators introduced a 
bipartisan bill, which aimed to improve the security of IoT 
devices by “establishing minimum security requirements for 
federal procurements of connected devices.”196 U.S. Sens. Mark 
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R. Warner (D-Va.) and Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), co-chairs of the 
Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, as well as Sens. Ron Wyden (D-
Or.) and Steve Daines (R-Mont.), introduced the “Internet of 
Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017,” which 
aimed to require that IoT “devices purchased by the U.S. 
government meet certain minimum security requirements.”197 
“Inter-connected device” is defined as “a physical object that (a) 
is capable of connecting to and is in regular connection with the 
Internet; and (b) has computer processing capabilities that can 
collect, send, or receive data.”198 
The legislation outlines several requirements for IoT 
vendors, including that their IoT devices are “patchable” in order 
“to fix or remove a vulnerability or defect in the software or 
firmware component in a properly authenticated and secure 
manner.”199 Second, the bill requires vendors to ensure that 
their products do not contain “known vulnerabilities,”200 
meaning “any attribute of hardware, firmware, software, 
process, or procedure or combination of 2 or more of these factors 
that could enable or facilitate the defeat or compromise of the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information 
system or its information or physical devices to which it is 
connected.”201 Third, the bill requires that vendors ensure their 
IoT devices “rely on standard protocols,” such as “standard ports 
for network traffic,” encryption, or “interconnection with other 
                                                          
Security of IoT Devices, in PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 405–09 (2017). 
 197. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note 
111. 
 198. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note 
111; see also Sarah Wronsky & Lawrence Block, Proposed Internet of Things 
Cybersecurity Bill May Create Hurdles for Government Contractors, GLOBAL 
REG. ENFORCEMENT LAW BLOG (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com 
/library/detail.aspx?g=c0da944b-4c46-4812-8bbf-dbf2540db87f. 
 199. See Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra 
note 111; Sen. Mark Warner et al., Fact Sheet, Internet of Things Cybersecurity 
Improvement Act of 2017, MARK R. WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
COMMONWEALTH VA., https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6 
/861d66b8-93bf-4c93-84d0-
6bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iot-cybesecurity-
improvement-act—-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 200. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note 
111; see also Mark Warner et al., supra note 199. 
 201. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note 
111. 
486 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
devices.”202 Finally, IoT devices cannot “include any fixed or 
hard-coded credentials used for remote administration, the 
delivery of updates, or communication.”203 
The legislation next outlines ways IoT vendors can help 
manage risks stemming from insecure devices. More specifically, 
if a governmental agency “reasonably believes that  
procurement of an [IoT] device [compliant with the legislation] 
would be unfeasible or economically impractical,” it may petition 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for permission “to 
purchase a non-compliant [IoT] device.”204 The OMB is required 
to develop “alternative network-level security requirements for 
devices with limited data processing and software 
functionality.”205 Each governmental agency is also required to 
maintain an inventory of their use of IoT devices.206 Finally, the 
bill directs the Department of Homeland Security National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NDDP) to 
[w]ork with industry to develop coordinated disclosure guidelines for 
vendors selling IoT to the US government, which vendors would then 
adopt, allowing researchers to uncover vulnerabilities in those 
products and responsibly share them with the vendor, without fear of 
liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) or 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).207 
In an August 1, 2017 statement, Sen. Warner explained why 
the legislation is needed.208 “While I’m tremendously excited 
about the innovation and productivity that Internet-of-Things 
devices will unleash, I have long been concerned that too many 
Internet-connected devices are being sold without appropriate 
safeguards and protections in place,” said Sen. Warner. “This 
legislation would establish thorough, yet flexible, guidelines for 
Federal Government procurements of connected devices. My 
hope is that this legislation will remedy the obvious market 
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failure that has occurred and encourage device manufacturers to 
compete on the security of their products.”209 
Sen. Gardner agreed, saying, 
The Internet of Things (IoT) landscape continues to expand, with most 
experts expecting tens of billions of devices operating on our networks 
within the next several years[.]As these devices continue to transform 
our society and add countless new entry points into our networks, we 
need to make sure they are secure from malicious cyber-attacks. This 
bipartisan, commonsense legislation will ensure the federal 
government leads by example and purchases devices that meet basic 
requirements to prevent hackers from penetrating our government 
systems without halting the life-changing innovations that continue 
to develop in the IoT space.210 
An August 2, 2017 Business Insider commentary noted that 
the legislation is “limited” because “[i]t only applies to vendors 
supplying the US federal government.”211 However, the article 
also cited Ray O’Farrell, chief technology officer at cloud 
computing firm VMware, who contended that the bill “includes 
‘reasonable security recommendations’ that would be important 
to improve protection of federal government networks.”212 Reed 
Smith LLP associate Sarah Wronsky and partner Lawrence 
Block also noted that despite the bill being limited in its scope, 
it still represents an important step to address IoT security.213 
“Although the bill does not apply to consumer devices, industry 
experts anticipate the proposed legislation is a stepping stone to 
broader regulation of security and privacy in all IoT devices,” 
Wronsky and Block wrote in an August 11 commentary for the 
Global Regulatory Enforcement Law Blog.214 “Despite its rapid 
increase in procurement of IoT devices, the government has yet 
to adequately address critical issues, including risk and 
uncertainty about privacy and security of the devices.”215 As of 
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February 2018, the Senate bill remained in committee, with a 
companion bill promised in the House of Representatives.216 
4. U.S. House of Representatives Bill 
In October 2017, several U.S. Representatives also took aim 
at regulating IoT devices, though in this case specifically 
targeting medical devices, or Internet of Medical Things (IoMT). 
Rep. David Trott (R-Mich.) introduced H.R. 3985, the “Internet 
of Medical Things Resilience Partnership Act of 2017,” which 
was first co-sponsored by Rep. Susan Brooks (R-Ind.) then by 
Rep. Erik Paulsen (R-Minn.) and Rep. Daniel Donovan (R-
N.Y.).217 Referred to the Subcommittee on Health, the bill’s 
purpose is to “establish a working group of public and private 
entities led by the Food and Drug Administration to recommend 
voluntary frameworks and guidelines to increase the security 
and resilience of Internet of Medical Things devices, and for 
other purposes.”218 
The bill requires the Commissioner of the FDA, in 
consultation with the NIST, to establish the working group, 
which will help create a report to be submitted to Congress. The 
report would be required to include: 
(1) an identification of existing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, 
frameworks, and best practices that are applicable to mitigate 
vulnerabilities in the devices described in subsection (a); (2) an 
identification of existing and developing international and domestic 
cybersecurity standards, guidelines, frameworks, and best practices 
that mitigate vulnerabilities in such devices; (3) a specification of 
high-priority gaps for which new or revised standards are needed; and 
(4) potential action plans by which such gaps can be addressed.219 
The NIST, an agency under the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, has previously drafted numerous documents, 
models, and more providing guidance related to cybersecurity 
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and IoT, all of which are available on their website.220 If H.R. 
3985 is eventually passed, or perhaps even if it is not, the NIST, 
as well as the FDA, will continue to be involved in drafting 
policies, recommendations, reports, and more related to IoT 
devices, including IoMT. 
B. PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES SELF-REGULATION 
Although some experts have demanded that the federal 
government address and regulate the IoT, others have called on 
private companies to engage in self-regulation. Larry Karisny, 
the director of ProjectSafety.org, an organization that finds, 
tests, and deploys solutions for cyber security,221 argues that it 
would be more advantageous for the IoT industry to self-regulate 
given that IoT suppliers and venture capitalist startups are 
“clearly aware” that they have to address the security and 
privacy issues of IoT devices or risk losing customers, spending 
money on regulatory issues, or facing legal action.222 He also 
contends that the IoT industry is already the one “moving 
cybersecurity forward.”223 
On October 23, 2017, Engadget reported that Google, Sprint, 
and other companies were backing UK mobile chip designer 
ARM’s new security framework called Platform Security 
Architecture (PSA).224 The goal of the project is to create a 
common industry framework and security foundation for every 
IoT device.225 According to ARM, 100 billion IoT devices already 
use its designs, with another 100 billion expected by 2021.226 
PSA is comprised of “threat models, security analyses, hardware 
and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source 
firmware reference implementation,” which, collectively, 
“provide[] a recipe” for security to be consistently designed into 
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IoT devices at the hardware and firmware levels.227 The 
framework therefore applies to the entire IoT industry and to all 
IoT devices, according to ARM.228 
In an October 23, 2017 “SiliconANGLE” blog post, senior 
staff writer Mike Wheatley explained that ARM’s proposal 
would address three problems associated with the IoT: first, that 
IoT devices “cannot easily be updated with new software to patch 
known vulnerabilities.”229 Second, PSA could address the 
problem that IoT devices come with default security credentials 
and generic usernames and passwords, which most consumers 
neglect to change or do not know that they need to change.230 
Finally, the initiative could address that most IoT devices store 
and send private data in plain-text format, which makes it easier 
to obtain if a device is compromised.231 
Wheatley also contended that industry analysts, in addition 
to several large corporations, supported ARM’s proposal.232 He 
quoted Patrick Moorhead, president and principal analyst at 
research firm Moor Insights & Strategy, who said: 
[b]road-based IoT deployment will require a fundamental rethinking 
on security and I think ARM’s industry proposal has a lot of merit . . . . 
Securing a trillion end points make security mandatory, not optional, 
and ARM’s proposal contemplates many of the most aggressive 
surface attack points and also provides a way to update the silicon in 
the future for new kinds of attacks.233 
On January 17, 2018, Business Wire reported that another 
company was seeking to improve security of the IoT.234 VDOO, a 
cybersecurity company, which says that it aims to become the 
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“Security Authority of IoT devices,”235 announced it had raised 
$13 million in initial funding to develop the company’s IoT 
security platform.236 The platform is intended to provide an 
automated process that analyzes gaps in devices’ security and 
subsequently delivers the approximate security requirements 
and implementation guidance based on the analysis.237 The 
platform would also provide security certification for nearly all 
IoT devices.238 Netanel Davidi, Co-CEO and founder of VDOO, 
claims that: 
[t]he problem is that there are no actionable processes or standards to 
guide IoT makers in the implementation of the proper security for 
each specific device. VDOO helps IoT makers protect their customers, 
by enabling them to set and implement the right security for each of 
their devices, in a quick and balanced manner.239 
In a January 31, 2018 post on her blog, Stacey 
Higginbotham, the former Senior Editor of Fortune, states that 
she “like[s] VDOO’s idea of trying to protect devices before they 
head out in the field in a scalable way.”240 She also notes, 
however, that VDOO faces several challenges, including that it 
is a “tall order” to ensure that “once a vulnerability is found, the 
[IoT] device gets updated and all devices in the field get 
patched.”241 
Higginbotham also notes that another startup, Armis, is 
attempting to improve IoT security from the “end-user 
perspective” by offering a subscription-based software that 
monitors the devices in a corporate or factory network.242 If a 
device demonstrates security vulnerabilities or other problems, 
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Armis’ software sends information to other security programs 
used by the company or it attempts to shut down the problematic 
equipment.243 
IV. REGULATION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Meanwhile, the European Union and the Article 29 Working 
Party have also taken action directly and indirectly affecting the 
IoT, including issuing position papers and an opinion,244 as well 
as passing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
ePrivacy Regulation,245 though questions remain about how the 
new regulations will affect the IoT. These regulations 
demonstrate the different approaches taken by the EU and the 
United States. The EU uses an omnibus approach, providing 
Europeans with certain rights of privacy across all platforms and 
sectors. The United States has a “patchwork quilt” of privacy 
laws applying to different industries.246 Moreover, under the 
First Amendment, United States law typically balances privacy 
rights and interests against freedom of expression, whereas the 
EU contends that privacy is a fundamental right, and the use of 
personal data by third parties should be subject to regulation, 
controls, and transparency, requiring government oversight. 
A. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY PUBLISHES INTERNET OF THINGS 
OPINION; EUROPEAN UNION PUBLISHES POSITION PAPERS 
In September 2014, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, which provides independent advice on data protection 
matters to the European Commission and helps develop data 
protection policies in the EU Member States, published “Opinion 
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8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the IoT.”247 In particular, 
the Working Party raised six particular concerns related to IoT 
devices, including “lack of control and information 
asymmetry,”248 “low-quality consent,”249 “extrapolation of 
inferences from data and repurposing of original processing,”250 
“intrusive identification of behaviour [sic] patterns and user 
profiling,”251 “limitations on the possibility of remaining 
anonymous whilst using services,”252 and “security risks,”253 
such as cyberattacks.254 The opinion also addressed how 
different EU laws would apply to the processing of personal data 
by IoT devices and the different parties within the IoT 
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user profiling” as certain private behaviors and habits becoming unwantedly 
identifiable through the use of the IoT). 
 252. Id. (“Wearing IoT objects that are close to the data subjects results in a 
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industry.255 Finally, the Working Party addressed the 
obligations imposed on IoT stakeholders, as well as the rights of 
data subjects.256 Ultimately, the Working Party concluded that 
although the IoT presents several benefits for users and IoT 
companies, the privacy and security challenges must also be 
followed closely, requiring IoT devices to have “legal and 
technical compliance.”257 The Working Party also intended the 
opinion to “contribute to the uniform application of the legal data 
protection framework in the IoT as well as to the development of 
a high level of protection with regard to the protection of 
personal data in the EU.”258 
In December 2016, the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA) led an initiative resulting in 
the issuance of position papers on IoT security.259 Joined by 
semiconductor manufacturing companies Infineon Technologies, 
NXP Semiconductors, and STMicroelectronics, ENISA cited 
concerns that a European market failure for cybersecurity and 
privacy “creates a severe risk that the European economy is 
falling behind in its ability to tap into the promising emerging 
IoT markets.”260 The papers concluded that there is “no basic 
level, no level zero defined for the security and privacy of 
connected and smart devices,” nor are there any legal 
guidelines.261 Thus, the agency contended that it is necessary to 
define the European Baseline Requirements for Security and 
Privacy in a way that “minimizes risk, is neutral in technological 
terms, and remains open to innovation.”262 
The top priorities outlined in the papers were related to the 
development of baseline requirements for IoT security and 
privacy.263 ENISA and the manufacturers agreed that any 
existing and new EU regulation should take standards 
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developed and supported by EU stakeholders into account.264 As 
the following sections will suggest, the GDPR and ePrivacy 
Regulation may have implications for the IoT.265 The papers also 
emphasized the need for EU Member States’ existing security 
processes and services to be evaluated and adapted to IoT 
devices, eventually leading to certification of the processes.266 In 
addition to analyzing and developing standard IoT 
requirements, the papers also called for greater awareness of EU 
citizens, organizations, and companies regarding security and 
privacy of the IoT.267 
ENISA further advocates that baseline requirements of IoT 
security and privacy must be effective in all areas of the IoT 
industry, from components to complex systems.268 The papers 
also called for appropriate training in schools, universities, and 
industry, a “level playing field” for all stakeholders, risk 
management practices, and more.269 
Since the publication of the Working Party’s opinion and 
ENISA’s process papers in 2016, an EU organization, a 
European organization, and a European initiative have been 
developed to address the security and privacy concerns 
stemming from the IoT. The Alliance for Internet of Things 
Innovation (AIOTI) was initiated as a result of the European and 
global IoT technology and market developments.270 According to 
its website, AIOTI “aims to create and master sustainable 
innovative European IoT ecosystems in the global context to 
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address the challenges of IoT technology and applications 
deployment including standardisation [sic], interoperability and 
policy issues.”271 The European Research Cluster on the Internet 
of Things (IERC) is a separate organization that aims to 
“address the large potential for IoT-based capabilities in Europe 
and to coordinate the convergence of ongoing activities.”272 The 
group aims to foster communication and coordination between 
different IoT projects throughout Europe.273 
A third European organization seeking to promote the IoT 
is the IoT-European Platforms Initiative (IoT-EPI), a collection 
of seven research and innovation projects related to the IoT.274 
The initiative, which has total funding of 50 M€ and a partner 
network of 120 established companies, is intended to develop 
innovative platform technologies and foster technology 
adoption.275 The organization also holds special events meant to 
foster networking amongst IoT companies and other 
organizations.276 
B. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IMPLICATIONS 
 As alluded to above, experts contend that the GDPR may 
have implications for the IoT, though questions remain about 
how the provisions of these regulations will apply to IoT devices 
in practice. On April 27, 2016, the European Union (EU) 
formally adopted the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)277 to replace the Data Protection Directive.278 The 
GDPR, which becomes effective on May 25, 2018, creates new 
responsibilities and obligations for data controllers and 
processors, while seeking to provide a clearer legal environment 
in which EU companies can operate.279 The EU estimated that 
this will save businesses a collective €2.3 billion ($2.7 billion) a 
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year.280 The regulation also aims to expand the privacy rights of 
EU citizens, providing them more control over their personal 
data.281 
The GDPR applies to both “controllers” and “processors” of 
data.282 A data controller is the person, organization, or business 
that determines how and why personal data is processed, 
whereas a data processor is the person or entity that processes 
personal data on behalf of the data controller.283 The GDPR 
defines processing as “any operation or set of operations which 
is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, 
whether or not by automated means, such as collection, 
recording, organization [etc.]”284 The GDPR applies to a company 
if it has a branch, office, subsidiary, or other establishment or 
partnership in the EU that collects, receives, transmits, uses, 
stores or otherwise processes personal data.285 The GDPR will 
also apply both when a company offers goods or services to 
individuals in the EU and when a company collects any 
information that is considered personal identifiable 
information.286 Controllers are responsible for ensuring that 
their processors abide by data protection laws.287 
Experts agree that there are several requirements in the 
GDPR that may have implications on the IoT industry. For 
example, the GDPR requires companies or organizations to 
conduct Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) when 
data processing “‘is likely to result in a high risk to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons.’”288 Given the high security and 
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privacy risks associated with the IoT, this requirement of the 
GDPR is likely to apply to IoT companies. 
Second, the GDPR requires that data breaches be reported 
if personal data is involved, such as in DDoS and ransomware 
cyberattacks. Companies dealing with personal data must be 
able to identify and deal with security breaches, in addition to 
creating a mandatory notification system in the event of any 
breaches of personal data.289 
Third, the GDPR outlines several requirements for how 
personal data is stored, either in the cloud or in-house hardware, 
and requires IoT companies to follow these provisions.290 
A fourth area arises for the IoT in GDPR requirements that 
an individual’s consent be obtained to process their personal 
data. Under the GDPR, silence or inactivity do not constitute 
valid consent; the data subject must agree to the data processing 
through an affirmative act.291 Additionally, the GDPR states 
that children under age 13 cannot give consent, and children 
between 13 and 15 are subject to EU Member States’ particular 
laws.292 As a result, IoT companies who create and/or market IoT 
devices for children have additional mandatory considerations 
regarding consent. 
Finally, the GDPR stipulates that data subjects have a 
right, at any time, to be informed about how their personal data 
is used and to whom it is disclosed.293 IoT devices present 
additional technologies that can lead a data controller to 
potentially lose track of the information.294 
C. EPRIVACY REGULATION IMPLICATIONS 
An additional framework that experts generally agree will 
have implications for the IoT is the ePrivacy Regulation, though 
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the full effects have yet to be seen. On January 10, 2017, the 
European Commission adopted the ePrivacy Regulation, which 
is meant to complement the existing ePrivacy Directive.295 The 
directive, adopted in 2002 to address issues raised by the 1995 
Data Protection Directive—a framework that governed the 
collection, processing, and use of personal data—was intended to 
protect EU citizens’ privacy and confidentiality rights as they 
used electronic communication services, as well as to regulate 
how telecommunications companies could use EU individuals’ 
data.296 The proposed ePrivacy Regulation extends coverage 
from telecommunication companies and internet service 
providers (ISPs) to include any company processing personal 
data.297 
Additionally, the ePrivacy Regulation is intended to 
consolidate EU Member States’ implementation of the law’s 
protections and align it with the GDPR.298 The move marks an 
additional step in the European Commission’s attempts to 
harmonize data protection across the EU because regulations 
have binding legal force throughout every EU member state.299 
Conversely, EU directives require member states to adopt their 
own laws that implement the desired specific outcomes of the 
directive, which often results in variations across EU member 
states.300 
Several experts point out that the ePrivacy Regulation 
“clearly” or “explicitly” mentions the IoT, specifically Recital 1, 
which states “the principle of confidentiality should apply to 
current and future means of communication,”301 and Recital 12, 
which reads, “Connected devices and machines increasingly 
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communicate with each other by using electronic 
communications networks. . . . In order to ensure full protection 
of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of 
communications . . . it is necessary to clarify that this 
Regulation should apply to the transmission of machine-to-
machine communications.”302 Additionally, provisions regarding 
the processing of communications data and consent 
requirements could also apply to IoT devices, though experts 
remain unsure about how great of an effect the regulation will 
have and what the implications will be.303 
V. LIABILITY 
According to a Mason Hayes & Curran May 2016 blog post, 
there are two main areas where liability can arise with IoT 
devices: a device malfunction and cyberattacks or hacks that 
lead to theft of personal data stored on the device or a larger 
network.304 The question arises in each of these cases: who is 
liable?305 So far, experts agree that this is largely unanswered.306 
However, several existing legal and regulatory concepts suggest 
how liability might be determined and handled with the IoT, 
including (1) enforcement actions by the FTC related to IoT 
devices, including those mentioned earlier section in this article, 
(2) End User License Agreements (EULAs) and product liability 
law, and (3) additional avenues, beyond product liability, that 
consumers may use to claim compensation for damages related 
to IoT devices. 
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AND CURRAN TECH LAW BLOG (May 19, 2016), https://www.mhc.ie 
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A. EXTRAPOLATING FROM FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
FTC enforcement actions related to IoT devices may predict 
potential liability considerations for the IoT. In its complaints 
against ASUS, D-Link, Lenovo, Vizio, and VTech, the FTC made 
several claims under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act), which makes “unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce” unlawful.307 
According to the Federal Reserve’s Consumer Compliance 
Handbook, Section 5(a), acts or practices are considered 
deceptive where “(1) a representation, omission, or practice 
misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) a consumer’s 
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is 
considered reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the 
misleading representation, omission, or practice is material.”308 
Acts or practices are considered unfair if they “cause[] or are 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”309 
One particular claim raised by the FTC in its enforcement 
actions was that an IoT company practiced “misrepresentation” 
when it failed to take “reasonable steps to ensure security.” For 
example, in its complaint against D-Link, the FTC alleged that 
the company “[failed] to take reasonable steps to secure the 
routers and Internet-protocol cameras they designed for, 
marketed, and sold to United States consumers.”310 In its 
complaint against VTech, the FTC alleged that the company 
maintained in its privacy policy that most personal information 
was encrypted, when, in fact, it was not.311 Similarly, the FTC 
claimed in several enforcement actions that IoT devices had 
                                                          
 307. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 308. FED. RES., FTCA § 5 UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES, at 1 
(2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf; see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 309. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 310. D-Link Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 1. 
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“vulnerabilities,”312 inadequate security measures,313 and 
insecure designs.314 
Second, the FTC also alleged in several of these cases that 
consumers were not notified of security breaches or of updates 
or patches that became available to improve security of IoT 
devices. For example, in its complaint against Vizio, the FTC 
alleged that the company “failed to adequately disclose that the 
‘Smart Interactivity’ feature comprehensively collected and 
shared consumers’ television viewing activity.”315 
Third, the FTC emphasized the security risks associated 
with users’ personal data, such as in the case against Lenovo in 
which the FTC alleged that the company “created two significant 
security vulnerabilities” because the users’ internet browser had 
access to “all of a consumer’s sensitive personal information that 
was transmitted on the Internet, such as login credentials, 
Social Security numbers, financial account information, medical 
information, and web-based email communications.”316 In the 
case against VTech, the FTC alleged that the company had 
violated COPPA, which protects children’s personal data.317 
Because the Commission enforces a variety of specific consumer 
protection statutes, it is possible it will attempt to make IoT 
companies liable for laws beyond COPPA, such as HIPAA, 
among others. 
Finally, the FTC alleged in each of its enforcement actions 
listed above that consumers had been injured or harmed as a 
result of the unfair practices by the technology companies. The 
FTC alleged that ASUS “subjected consumers to substantial 
injury”318 and that Lenovo’s practice of collection and sharing of 
sensitive data without consumers’ consent has “caused or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”319 
However, although the FTC alleged in its complaint against 
D-Link that the company’s practices “caused, or are likely to 
                                                          
 312. ASUSTek Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 3; Lenovo Complaint, supra 
note 148, ¶ 11. 
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cause, substantial injury to consumers in the United States,”320 
Judge Donato rejected this claim, ruling that the FTC needed to 
be more specific in tying its claims about a company’s 
misrepresentations of IoT product security to evidence of 
concrete harm to consumers.321 
Experts contended throughout 2017 that the FTC may, in 
fact, be shifting towards a “concrete harms” approach in its data 
security enforcement actions. While serving as acting 
Chairwoman of the FTC, Maureen K. Ohlhausen was one of two 
commissioners who were critical of the FTC’s decisions to bring 
enforcement actions alleging unfair data security practices 
against companies in situations when consumer harm was not 
clearly apparent.322 In January 2017, Ohlhausen dissented from 
the agency’s filing of a complaint against D-Link, contending 
that the focus of FTC action should be a showing of tangible 
harm prior to taking enforcement action and that part of 
“regulatory humility” is to foster both business innovation and 
privacy innovation.323 
In a February 2017 speech before the American Bar 
Association, Ohlhausen contended that her leadership of the 
FTC would focus on enforcement actions in which concrete 
harms could be alleged.324 “The FTC should focus enforcement 
on matters where consumers are harmed or where companies 
don’t keep their promises,” Ohlhausen said during the speech. 
“The agency should focus on cases with properly and objectively 
determined concrete harms such as diminished or disrupted 
                                                          
 320. D-Link Complaint, supra note 134, at ¶ 29. 
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competition, monetary injury, and unwarranted health and 
safety risks.”325 
By focusing on concrete harms, Ohlhausen promised “to 
deepen the FTC’s understanding of the economics of 
privacy . . . includ[ing] studying consumer preferences and the 
relationship between access to consumer information and 
innovation.”326 She contended that concentrating on consumer 
injury will allow the FTC to be more selective and better allocate 
its limited resources. During her February 2017 speech, 
Ohlhausen said, “for every consumer protection case the FTC 
brings, we must ensure that we seek and obtain for consumers 
relief that is tied to consumer injury.”327 
Ohlhausen drew a distinction between a “notice-and-choice 
approach” to privacy protection and a “harms-based 
approach.”328 The “notice-and-choice” approach, generally 
favored by the FTC under President Barack Obama, gave 
consumers the choice to “opt out” of sharing certain types of 
information, such as Personal Identifiable Information (PII). 
The “harms-based” approach, on the other hand, seeks to protect 
consumers only from privacy breaches that are harmful.329 
On April 4, 2017 Consumer Affairs reported that Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) staff attorney Sophia Cope claimed 
the harms-based approach “is exactly what companies have been 
hoping for.”330 “It removes consumer choice and control over 
their privacy,” Cope wrote in an email to Consumer Affairs,331 
Now bureaucrats get to decide that certain data practices are not 
harmful, even if they include collecting highly sensitive information 
about people and what they do online, engaging in non-stop online 
surveillance, monetizing that information for commercial gain, and 
sharing that information with numerous unknown parties. 
Consumers deserve better from the FTC.332 
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In October 2017, President Donald Trump announced that 
he would nominate Joseph Simons to replace Ohlhausen as the 
new head of the FTC, as well as naming three additional 
nominees to the agency.333 Simons previously served as a co-
chair of the antitrust practice at the law firm Paul Weiss, where 
his clients included Microsoft and Sony, among other technology 
companies.334 Simons also served as the FTC’s competition 
bureau under President George W. Bush. 
According to The Washington Post on October 19, 2017, 
some policy analysts, including Berin Szoka, president of the 
think tank TechFreedom, argued that Simons’ first task should 
be to clarify how the FTC communicates its expectations to 
companies involved in data security. In response to a question 
posed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation asking what he felt to be the top three challenges 
facing the FTC, Simons stated that one such challenge was that 
“[r]apid changes in technology and cyber threats provide a 
significant challenge to the Agency’s ability to fulfill its 
consumer protection mission and provide meaningful guidance 
to the business community.”335 Simons argued that the FTC 
must continue to protect consumers despite these challenges, 
which would likely include IoT devices. He said, “It is critical, 
despite these challenges, that the FTC protect consumers 
without unduly burdening them or interfering with the ability of 
firms (especially small firms and new entrants) to use data to 
enhance competition.”336 Thus, although he did not explicitly 
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discuss the IoT, Simons’ answer suggested that the FTC will 
continue enforcement actions to protect consumers in the face of 
cyber threats. 
Ultimately, questions remain about whether the FTC will 
continue enforcement actions against IoT companies if they 
cannot prove concrete harm. Even if the agency does not take 
this approach, Judge Donato’s decision in the D-Link case 
problematizes the ability of the FTC to hold companies liable for 
harms caused to consumers without concrete evidence. It is also 
worth noting that the FTC actions described in this article are 
not binding court verdicts, though they still represent, 
potentially, the beginning of a standard for security in the IoT.337 
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND END USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS 
Providing additional insight into liability related to the IoT, 
product liability is an area of law in which manufacturers and 
retailers are held responsible for damages caused by their 
products’ failures.338 Liability claims fall into three categories: 
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.339 Negligence 
refers to liability where the product manufacturer’s conduct is 
called into question, such as whether the company acted with a 
lesser standard of care than someone in similar circumstances 
would have exercised.340 Strict liability holds a manufacturer 
responsible for the damages caused by its product, such as if it 
was defective, whether related to design, manufacturing, or 
packaging. A product may also be defective if the company failed 
to provide an adequate warning to consumers.341 Finally, 
breach-of-warranty cases arise when a manufacturer violates 
the warranties it makes for a product.342 
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For traditional devices, consumers can generally receive 
compensation from manufacturers, suppliers, or sellers provided 
they can demonstrate personal injury or property damage from 
a defective product, such as a traditional refrigerator causing a 
fire that burned down an individual’s home.343 However, this is 
not the case for most IoT devices, largely due to EULAs, which 
are contracts signed or accepted by consumers in order to use 
their IoT products.344 Although IoT devices have the potential to 
cause or lead to a range of harm, such as from a hacker 
controlling a thermostat and turning off a homeowner’s heat in 
the winter, causing pipes to freeze,345 EULAs “allow 
manufacturers to disclaim most, if not all, liability for damages 
incurred by the usage of IoT products.”346 Thus, EULAs and 
software licenses make it very difficult, if not impossible, for 
consumers to claim compensations when products fail or when 
these types of damages occur.347 
The challenge for consumers is that in order to gain full 
access to all the functionalities of most IoT devices, they must 
sign the software agreement or EULA, which is rarely 
negotiable.348 Nest, a smart appliances vendor, for example, 
employs a restrictive EULA that disclaims all liabilities for its 
product’s failures, but requires users to sign the agreement in 
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order to use their smart thermostats.349 Consequently, the users 
have entered into a contract with Nest in which they relinquish 
the right to sue for damages caused by the thermostat. 
Perhaps the only viable way for consumers to hold 
manufacturers and others liable for damages caused by an IoT 
device is by demonstrating that the contract was 
“unconscionable.”350 In order for a contract to be deemed as such, 
the user must show both procedural unfairness (“procedural 
unconscionability”) and unfairness in substantive terms 
(“substantive unconscionability”), “on a kind of sliding scale, 
where a showing of greater unfairness on one means that less 
unfairness need be shown on the other.”351 Generally, procedural 
unconscionability relates to the process of making a contract and 
includes unequal bargaining power or surprises in the contract 
process, such as obscure language hidden in small print.352 
Conversely, substantive unconscionability relates to the actual 
terms of the contract being one-sided or overly harsh.353 
However, there is to date no clear framework, nor court decision, 
related to unconscionability of EULAs tied to IoT devices.354 
Additional aspects of IoT devices further complicate product 
liability.355 First, the complexity of IoT devices’ interconnectivity 
“makes it much harder to establish who is liable under 
traditional laws and regulations when something goes wrong.”356 
Second, as Lucas Amodio, an intellectual property attorney at 
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, contends, where data is compromised 
by hacks, it is often hard to quantify the damage caused as 
opposed to physical damages.357 The Mason Hayes & Curran 
2016 blog post questions whether the aggrieved IoT user is 
required to prove they have suffered damage or harm stemming 
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from an IoT company’s actions.358 One final consideration is 
whether liability related to IoT devices should be criminal, civil 
or both. The Mason Hayes & Curran post argues that the answer 
depends on the severity of the harm.359 
C. OTHER METHODS CONSUMERS CAN USE TO CLAIM 
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES 
Product liability lawsuits are not the only way consumers 
can fight back when they suffer damages. Collective consumer 
backlash could deter companies from creating faulty products in 
the first place or discourage other consumers from buying the 
products.360 Additionally, federal agencies, especially the FTC, 
may undertake enforcement actions against companies who do 
not adequately protect consumers’ security and privacy, leading 
to settlements or other enforcement actions.361 The Mason Hayes 
& Curran post also argues that an alternate approach to product 
litigation would be for courts and legislators to consider 
assigning liability between each actor in the IoT product and 
network chain, regardless of their culpability.362 However, the 
authors of the post concede that this not as simple as it sounds 
because a court would be required to determine whether the 
liability lies with the IoT companies or the actual hacker.363 
For example, on October 21, 2015, the Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade held a hearing on 
“Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle and Roadway Safety.”364 
The Subcommittee considered a legislative staff discussion draft 
document that included multiple proposals intended to improve 
motor vehicle safety processes and privacy practices among auto 
manufacturers, and prepare the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the next generation of 
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vehicles and innovation in the auto industry.365 One draft 
measure proposed that car manufacturers be fined $5,000 a day 
if they did not submit a detailed privacy policy to the 
Department of Transportation.366 Under the draft legislation, 
car manufacturers could be held liable if they violate any part of 
their own privacy policies or if they fail to file a privacy policy in 
the first place.367 However, “the maximum penalty automakers 
face would be limited to $1 million, and they would be shielded 
from Federal Trade Commission scrutiny for ‘unfair’ or 
‘deceptive’ acts related to privacy as long as their privacy policies 
meet all the legislation’s requirements,” thus creating a safe 
harbor for manufacturers.368 
One final recourse for consumers could be through state law, 
specifically data disposal laws, security breach notification laws, 
and general data security laws pertaining to the private 
sector.369 According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), data disposal laws, passed by at least 32 
states, require entities to destroy, dispose of, or otherwise make 
unreadable personal information.370 
Conversely, security breach notification laws, enacted by 48 
states and Washington, D.C., require private or governmental 
entities to notify individuals of security breaches in which 
personally identifiable information is implicated or 
compromised.371 According to the NCSL, security breach laws 
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generally have provisions regarding “who must comply with the 
law (e.g., businesses, data/ information brokers, government 
entities, etc.); definitions of ‘personal information’ (e.g., name 
combined with SSN, [driver’s] license or state ID, account 
numbers, etc.); what constitutes a breach (e.g., unauthorized 
acquisition of data); requirements for notice (e.g., timing or 
method of notice, who must be notified); and exemptions (e.g., 
for encrypted information).”372 
Thirteen states also have more general data security laws 
that address other aspects of security, generally taking a more 
preemptive or preventative approach.373 Most contain 
requirements that businesses that own, license, or maintain 
personal data must implement and maintain reasonable 
security procedures, as well as protect personal information from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or 
disclosure.374 Massachusetts Regulation 201 CMR 17.00 
provides an example of preemptive action in that it includes an 
extensive list of protocols companies must implement into their 
security architecture if they handle personal information.375 
In a March 2016 special feature titled “Internet of Things: 
The Security Challenge,” ZDNet contributor and TechRepublic 
associate editor Amy Talbott noted that at least one state has a 
law specifically addressing IoT devices—in this case, smart 
TVs.376 She noted that California, which has comparably strong 
data privacy laws, has a statute related to the security of IoT 
televisions. Business & Professions Code sections 22948.20–
22948.25 prohibit a “person or entity [from] provid[ing] the 
operation of a voice recognition feature within this state without 
prominently informing, during the initial setup or installation of 
a connected television, either the user or the person designated 
by the user to perform the initial setup or installation of the 
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connected television.”377 The law also limits how recordings 
collected by the remote can be used or distributed.378 
Talbott also contended that these state privacy laws, 
although most do not specifically mention the IoT, are generally 
applicable to IoT devices because they frequently collect users’ 
personal data.379 However, a May 2017 article by FCW, which 
provides federal technology executives with information, ideas, 
and strategies, argues that its policymakers still must determine 
whether new laws at the federal and state level are needed to 
help ensure the security of IoT devices.380 He quotes Naomi 
Lefkowitz, a senior privacy policy advisor at the NIST, who said 
that “there will be no perfect privacy,” but that the IoT 
“require[s] additional legislative solutions.”381 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the concluding pages of E.M. Forster’s novella, The 
Machine Stops,382 the human inhabitants of a dystopian 
subterranean world discover that “the Machine,” the omnipotent 
mechanical being upon which they depend for food, shelter, 
communication, travel, and other elements necessary for life, is 
breaking down. Although initially the Machine had been merely 
a tool, subservient to its human masters, over time, “Humanity, 
in its desire for comfort . . . [q]uietly and complacently, [] was 
sinking into decadence, and progress had come to mean the 
progress of the Machine.” Gradually, “all, save a few retrogrades, 
worship[ped] it as divine,” relying on the Book of the Machine, a 
vast technological manual “with instructions against any 
possible contingency” to guide their lives. Complaints about 
malfunctions were channeled to a Committee on the Mending 
Apparatus, which in turn forwarded them to an anonymous 
Central Committee, which might or might not respond – or 
might retaliate with punishment. But as the original inventors 
of the Machine die off, fewer people understand how the Machine 
functions. The Mending Apparatus breaks down, and 
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eventually, the Machine itself malfunctions and, without 
warning, stops, dooming humankind. Yet one of the characters 
observes, “Oh, tomorrow – some fool will start the Machine 
again, tomorrow!” 
Forster’s cautionary tale is obviously an allegory. It warns 
of the loss of privacy and humanity that can occur when human 
beings are too dependent on technology to fulfill their needs, and 
of the risks to fundamental values when that technology is 
poorly understood. His prescient novella encourages us to 
remember that we must be the ones to control “the Machine.” 
As the Internet of Things becomes more and more pervasive, 
it is tempting, and some might say inevitable, to simply cede 
individual sovereignty to those who develop and operate the 
technology. But through law, regulations, litigation, and 
consumer activism, we have the capacity to rewrite “The Book of 
the Machine.” And we must. 
 
  
*** 
